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Managing Interjurisdictional Waters
under the Great Lakes Charter Annex
Mark Squillace and Sandra Zellmer
n spring 1998, the Nova Group of Sault Ste.
Marie, Ontario, proposed to ship nearly 160 million gallons of Lake Superior water annually via
tanker to Asia. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT
LAKES: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF

44 (2000) (2000
IJC Report). Nova's proposal coincided with declining
water levels in the Great Lakes, and the resulting public outcry and pressure from other Great Lakes governments persuaded Ontario to revoke Nova's permit
just a few months later. The Nova proposal prompted
the eight American states and two Canadian provinces
bordering the Great Lakes to revisit the Great Lakes
Charter of 1985 and adopt Annex 2001. See Annex to
the Great Lakes Charter, June 18, 2001, available at
www.cglg.org/1 pdfs/Annex2001 .pdf (Annex 2001).
Annex 2001 commits the Great Lakes governors and
premiers to improve their management of Great
Lakes water resources through binding agreements.
Their self-imposed, three-year deadline for meeting
this mandate is June 18, 2004. This article examines
the history of water resources management in the
Great Lakes Basin and considers the challenges and
opportunities presented by Annex 2001.
The Great Lakes-Huron, Ontario, Michigan,
Erie and Superior-cover approximately ninety-five
thousand square miles and contain 20 percent of the
world's and 95 percent of North America's fresh surface water. Due to their vast size, Great Lakes water
levels remain remarkably steady overall, with normal
fluctuation ranging from one to two feet in any given
year. Even so, Great Lakes water levels are highly
sensitive to climatic variability, as demonstrated during the severe droughts of the 1930s and 1960s. See
2000 IJC Report at § 2. In recent years, Great Lakes
water levels have been on a downward trend, and
they are currently at their lowest level since 1965.
There is growing consensus that climate change will
have a dramatic affect on global precipitation patterns and the hydrologic cycle, and lake levels in the
Great Lakes possibly could drop an additional two to
five feet before the end of the twenty-first century.
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See 2000 IJC Report at 44.
Meanwhile, demand for water is plainly on the
rise. In 1997, the United Nations reported that 40 percent of the world's population suffered from water
shortages that limit economic and social development.
See Paul Lewis, U.N. Report Warns of Problemsover
Dwindling Water Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1997, at
A6. Six years later, it predicted that "the overriding
problem ... of the 21st century [will be] one of water
quality and management." See UNITED NATIONS, THE
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT-WATER FOR

(Mar. 5, 2003).
Although data on water consumption in the Great
Lakes Basin is incomplete, with many uses unreported,
a 2002 assessment estimates that, as of 1998, around
2,200 million gallons per day or 3,350 cubic feet per
second (cfs) are consumed, principally for agriculture,
domestic supplies, and industry. See INTERNATIONAL
PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE

WATER USES REVIEW TASK FORCE, PROTECTION OF
THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: THREE YEAR RE-

VIEW 48 (Nov. 2002).
In addition to consumptive uses, substantial quantities of water are diverted both into and out of the
Great Lakes Basin. The most notorious of the four
major diversions began in 1848, when the State of Illinois constructed a canal to divert water from Lake
Michigan for Chicago's water supply and sewage disposal, along with navigation. Extensive litigation ensued between Illinois, the other Great Lakes states and
the United States Army Corps of Engineers. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930). Illinois continues to divert, on average, 3,200 cfs, lowering the
levels of Lakes Michigan and Huron by 0.21 feet. See
INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, GREAT LAKES
DIVERSIONS AND CONSUMPTIVE USES: A REPORT TO
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND

1977 REFERENCE 15 (1985).
The oldest and the largest of the diversions is the
Welland Canal, which was built in 1829 to move water
across the Niagara Peninsula so that ships could bypass
Niagara Falls. The flow through the canal has averaged 9,200 cfs annually since 1973, lowering the levels
of Lakes Michigan, Huron, and Superior by one to two
inches, and of Lake Erie by about five inches. Id. at
16-18. Despite the Welland Canal's enormous impact
on the upper Great Lakes-more than all of the upper
basin's consumptive uses combined-it is not treated as
CANADA UNDER THE
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a consumptive use because it does not divert water out
of the basin. Its impact on the upper basin, however, is
no different than a consumptive use, and the substantial loss of upper basin water through this diversion deserves more attention.
Another significant diversion brings water from
tributaries ofJames Bay into Lake Superior to transport
pulpwood logs and provide hydroelectric power. This
project counterbalances the Chicago and Welland
Canal diversions by raising the levels of Lakes Superior,
Michigan, and Huron by approximately one-half of a
foot. Id. Finally, the New York State Barge Canal takes
water from the Niagara River for navigation purposes
and returns all of it to Lake Ontario. Id. at 20. Together, these four diversions raise the mean levels of Lake
Superior by 0.07 feet and of Lake Ontario by 0.08 feet,
and lower the mean levels of Lakes Michigan and
Huron by 0.02 feet and of Lake Erie by 0.33 feet. Id.
A surge of interest in diversions from the Great
Lakes occurred during the 1980s, when western interests proposed to use Great Lakes water to recharge the
Ogallala Aquifer, to supply water for a coal slurry
pipeline in Wyoming, and to improve navigation on
the Mississippi River. Even though these proposals
arose during a time of record-high water levels, they
caused alarm in the basin, and protectionist legislation
was enacted at both state and federal levels.
The vast quantities of water available in the Great
Lakes makes continued interest in the resource inevitable. Indeed, the Nova Company is not alone in
proposing twenty-first century export or diversion
schemes. In 2001, the city of Webster, New York, situated on the shore of Lake Ontario, ran ads in the New
York Times and Wall Street]ournalproclaiming "Water
for Sale." See Waterfor Sale, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22,
2001, at B2 1. The town received inquiries from a Texas
businessman who proposed putting the water in rail
cars and shipping it south. Political pressure from
Great Lakes governors squelched that plan. In 2002,
the Perrier Company began pumping and bottling millions of gallons of groundwater within the basin, generating intense controversy in Michigan and
Wisconsin. See Joan Lowy, Water Wars Pit Bottlers vs.
Residents, GRAND RAPIDS PR., Mar. 31, 2002, at Al.
While the total volume of water from this project is
relatively insignificant when compared with the massive diversions and other water uses in the basin, the
response underscores the significant political attention
that will likely accompany any Great Lakes water management proposal.
Economic constraints, however, make large-scale
water exports from the Great Lakes Basin impractical.
Unless the price of water increases dramatically, transportation costs make shipments to far-away countries
or the arid American West unlikely. 2000 IJC Report at
16. Nonetheless, as worldwide demand for fresh water
continues to grow while supplies shrink, the economic
NR&E Fall 2003

viability of future water exports is difficult to predict.
Uncertainties over future water trends offer an incentive to put in place a management regime that will help
ensure the long-term health and sustainability of the
Great Lakes Basin and its water resources.
The Law of the Great Lakes
Annex 2001 is a notable example of an unusually
cooperative, multipartisan interstate and international
climate, and it provides a remarkable opportunity for
managing and sustaining Great Lakes water resources.
The Annex was built on a solid foundation of Great
Lakes water law that began with the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909.
Early in the twentieth century, boundary waters
between Canada and the United States, and especially
the Great Lakes, were a "significant political irritant"
between the two countries, with points of contention
ranging from navigation to power generation to diversions. See Stephen J. Toope and Jutta Brunnee, Freshwater Regimes: The Mandate of the InternationalJoint
Commission, 15 ARiZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 273, 277
(1998). In 1909, the United States and Canada entered
into the Boundary Waters Treaty to address diversions
while ensuring that each nation's sovereign interests
remained intact. Treaty Between the United States and
Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada,
Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2448. The
Boundary Waters Treaty established the IJC, a
six-member joint tribunal with jurisdiction over obstructions or diversions on either side of the border affecting the natural level or flow of boundary waters.
The most important role of the IJC has been to prepare analytical reports on issues, or references, upon
the request of the governments.
The Great Lakes Basin Compact, initially adopted
in the 1950s and subsequently endorsed by Congress
and signed into law in 1968, commits the Great Lakes
states to collaborate on regional issues. Pub. L. No.
90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968). Among the compact's
more significant provisions was the creation of the
Great Lakes Commission, an interstate compact
agency that assists in coordinating decisions pertaining
to Great Lakes diversions and water use. The
Provinces of Ontario and Quebec have recently accepted associate member status on the Great Lakes
Commission, which will strengthen a partnership between the governments.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the alarming decline
in Great Lakes water quality drew the attention of
both Canada and the United States. The Cuyahoga
River, a tributary to Lake Erie, smoldered and caught
fire when a spark landed in its polluted waters, providing one impetus for the Clean Water Act of 1972, 33

U.S.C. §§ 1251 etseq. The two Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreements between the United States and
Canada followed closely on its heels. See Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement of 1972, Apr. 15, 1972,
U.S.-Can., 23 U.S.T. 301 and Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement of 1978, Nov. 22, 1978, U.S.-Can.,
30 U.S.T. 1383 (amended 1983 and 1987) (GLWQA).
Although the GLWQA is concerned primarily with
controlling chemical pollutants, it adopts an ecosystem
approach that could have some bearing on water quantity as well as water quality. The agreement commits
the parties to "make a maximum effort to develop programs, practices and technology necessary for a better
understanding of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem,"
with the goal of restoring and maintaining "the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of
the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." GLWQA, at art.
II. Article lV commits the parties to protect beneficial
uses of water from the cumulative effects of pollutants.
A 1983 protocol to the GLWQA declares the "right of
each country in the use of the Great Lakes waters,"
while reaffirming the parties' intent to prevent pollution resulting from population growth, resource development and water usage. Protocol Amending the 1978
Agreement Between the United States of America and
Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, Oct. 16, 1983,
U.S.-Can., 35 U.S.T. 2370. For further discussion of
the GLWQA's control of chemical pollutants, see the
article by David Fischer on page 51 in this issue.
In 1985, in response to the perceived threat posed
by a proposal to divert Great Lakes water for a coal
slurry pipeline from the Powder River Basin in
Wyoming, the Great Lakes governors and premiers
signed the Great Lakes Charter to address diversions
and consumptive uses. See The Great Lakes Charter,
Principles for the Management of Great Lakes Water
Resources. The charter provides for notification and
consultation among the governors and premiers for
proposals to divert more than five million gallons per
day (gpd) over a thirty-day period. In order to participate in the charter's consultation process, the states
and provinces are required to adopt a registration requirement for all new or increased consumptive uses
greater than one hundred thousand gpd, and a permit
system for all new or increased diversions or consumptive uses that exceed two million gpd. These requirements force the Great Lakes jurisdictions away
from the common law doctrine of riparian water law,
which has historically limited the governmental role
in water resource management. Unfortunately, only
Illinois, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Wisconsin, and
Ontario have adopted both registration and permit
requirements. While Quebec continues to work on its
water management program, neither Indiana nor
Pennsylvania has adopted permit requirements, and
instead of regulating water usage, Michigan enacted a
statute that merely prohibits out-of-basin diversions.

§ 324.32703 (West
1999). Although the Michigan law almost certainly
violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution in light of Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941 (1982), as a practical matter the validity of the
Michigan statute is not likely of much consequence
because the federal Water Resources Development
Act (WRDA), 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20, which is described below, effectively precludes most out-of-basin
diversions from the Great Lakes.
Congress granted specific authority to the Great
Lakes governors to control water usage in 1986 when
it adopted WRDA. Id. WRDA provides that no diversion of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin may occur
without the unanimous approval of all of the affected
governors. To emphasize the local nature of decisionmaking, Congress prohibited any federal agency from
studying the feasibility of diverting Great Lakes water
unless all the Great Lakes governors first approved
the study. Id. § 1962d-20(e). Congress amended
WRDA in 2000 to add that all Great Lakes governors
must also approve any exports out of the basin. Id.
§ 1962d-20(b)(3). As a result, a single governor can
wield veto power over any proposal for a water diversion or export from the basin. The 2000 amendments
also foreshadowed the 2001 Annex by declaring congressional policy "to encourage the Great Lakes
states, in consultation with the provinces of Ontario
and Quebec, to develop and implement a mechanism
that provides a common conservation standard embodying the principles of water conservation and resource improvement for making decisions concerning
the withdrawal and use of water from the Great Lakes
Basin." Id. § 1962d-20(b)(2).
As of 2003, the only diversion to receive formal
WRDA approval allows the City of Akron, Ohio, to divert 4.8 million gallons per day from Lake Erie to
serve three unincorporated areas outside of the Great
Lakes watershed. The Akron project is required to return an equivalent quantity of water to Lake Erie from
the Ohio River watershed.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

The Great Lakes CharterAnnex of 2001
For the most part, the Great Lakes Charter, along
with WRDA and the Boundary Waters Treaty, have
been viewed as adequate to serve the needs of this temperate region. Water shortages and contentious disputes over water resources in the Great Lakes Basin
have been relatively rare. Nova's proposal to export
water from Lake Superior in 1998, however, raised the
specter of possible future problems and prompted the
Canadian government to declare a moratorium on all
bulk water exports from all boundary waters, including
the Great Lakes. Meanwhile, the Canadian and United
States governments asked the IJC to examine the issue
NIR&E Fall 2003

of water exports. In February 2000, the IJC issued a rethe withdrawal must result in an "improvement" of
port and recommendations, one of which was that dewater or water-dependent resources of the Great
finitive standards should be developed to govern
Lakes. Finally, the withdrawal must comply with all approposals to remove water from the basin. See 2000
plicable existing laws. Id.
IJC Report at 49. The governors and premiers reDirective IV commits the parties to consultasponded with Annex 2001. A comprehensive new set of
tion regarding out-of-basin diversions in accorlaws that will provide for management of the water redance with the terms of WRDA. Directive V calls
sources of the Great Lakes for many years to come is a
for the design of an information-gathering system
necessary next step.
to facilitate implementation of the charter and any
Annex 2001 provides both a challenge and an opagreement reached pursuant to the charter. Direcportunity to accomplish this objective by establishing
tive VI makes a series of sweeping, but somewhat
a framework for a new set of binding agreements
vague, promises to "identify and implement effecgoverning withdrawals of water from the Great
tive mechanisms for decisionmaking and dispute
Lakes. The Annex encompasses the entire Great
resolution." Id.
Lakes Basin, which includes "streams, rivers, lakes,
IJC's 2000 Report reflects many of the same obconnecting channels, and other bodies of water, injectives as Annex 2001. IJC, however, recommends
cluding tributary groundwater" which naturally flow
separate standards for removals and consumptive
into the Great Lakes. Annex 2001, at 3. The term
uses. Much like Annex 2001, IJC recommends that
"withdrawal" means any removal
major new uses of water be disapof water for consumptive use, reproved unless cumulative impacts
gardless of whether the water reare fully considered, effective
turns to the basin or not. Id. The
conservation practices are impleoriginal draft of Annex 2001 promented at the place of use, and
sound planning is applied. IJC
vided for a de minimis exemption
Proper m ana'gement of
that would have granted automatic
2000 Report § 11, Rec. 2. By
approval for any withdrawal of
new uses ne -ess irily involves
contrast, removals of water by difewer than one million gallons per
version, export or otherwise
day, regardless of location or poshould be disapproved, according
tential cumulative effects, but the
managern tof
to the IJC, unless the proponent
drafters ultimately dropped this
can satisfy the foregoing stanprovision from the final version of
dards and also demonstrate that
the Annex. Thus, Annex 2001 covthere are no practical alternatives
ers all diversions, exports, and
for obtaining water and that no
consumptive uses.
net loss of water resources from the area will result.
The Annex contains six directives. Directive I
Id. § 11, Rec. 1.
provides that an interstate compact or "such other
agreements, protocols or other arrangements" will
Toward Comprehensive Management of the
memorialize the binding commitments of the states
Great Lakes Water Resources
and provinces. Annex 2001, at 3. In Directive II, the
signatories commit to an ongoing process of public
participation in the preparation of binding agreeDespite the many laws and agreements that curments. Notably, if the Annex results in a binding
rently govern Great Lakes water management, the
agreement between the states and provinces, congrescontroversies that surround the recent, relatively
sional approval will be required under Article I § 10 of
minor water withdrawal proposals demonstrate the
the U.S. Constitution.
ongoing failure of the Great Lakes states and
The most important of the directives is probably
provinces to effectively manage the largest fresh surDirective III, which establishes substantive principles
face water resource in the world. As they strive to
for new or increased water withdrawals. First, water
comply with the directives in Annex 2001, the states
loss must be prevented or minimized through return
and provinces have the opportunity to adopt a comflow or "sound and economically feasible water conserprehensive water management program that is curvation measures." Second, there must be no signifirently lacking in the Great Lakes Basin.
cant adverse impacts, either individually or
As the 2002 IJC Task Force Report makes clear,
cumulatively, to the quantity or quality of water or
fears about burgeoning consumptive use of water rewater-dependent resources. "Water-dependent natural
sources in the basin have been "significantly overesresources" include the "interacting components of
timated and overstated for the past three decades."
land, water, and living organisms affected by the waters
INTERNATIONAL WATER USES REVIEW TASK FORCE,
of the Great Lakes basin." Annex 2001, at 3. Third,
PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT
NR&E Fall 2003

14 (Nov. 2002). This
fact does not excuse the failure to provide for comprehensive management of Great Lakes water resources, but it does suggest that time remains to
address the Great Lakes water management problems in a thoughtful and deliberate way.
But the window of opportunity will not last forever. The Task Force Report acknowledges that much
scientific uncertainty remains about the extent of current usage, the interrelationship between ground and
surface water resources, and perhaps most importantly,
the impact of climate change on Great Lakes water resources. Moreover, the Great Lakes states and
provinces may lack adequate power to limit trade in
their water resources as a result of international trade
agreements, such as NAFTA. As the report notes, this
may be especially true if they fail to adopt water conservation requirements. Accordingly, potentially serious water resource problems loom on the horizon if
the Great Lakes states and provinces fail to seize the
opportunity presented by Annex 2001 to adopt meaningful changes in the current management regime.
Annex 2001 commits the parties to establishing a
new water management system that is "simple, durable,
efficient, retains and respects authority within the
Basin, and most importantly, protects and conserves,
restores and improves the waters and water-dependent
natural resources of the Great Lakes Basin." Annex
2001 at 1. As described previously, Directive III of the
Annex directs the parties to establish a decision making
standard for "new proposals to withdraw water ... as
well as proposals to increase existing water withdrawals
or existing water withdrawal capacity." Annex 2001 at
3. The new standard is supposed to be based upon,
among other things, "environmentally sound and economically feasible water conservation measures." Id.
Unfortunately, the Annex does not address directly
the need to conserve water from existing uses. As a result, the focus of the Decision Making Standard Working Group seems to be on finding an appropriate
triggering mechanism-a specified volume of waterfor reviewing and passing upon proposed new water
uses. Such a mechanism will not solve the water management problems facing the Great Lakes. First, setting a trigger below which new uses will not be
reviewed encourages proposals that are just below the
triggering threshold. Moreover, any plan that focuses
solely on new water withdrawals will invite existing
users to maximize their rights by increasing their actual consumption by recapturing and reusing and perhaps even selling the water, reducing the amount sent
back to the system even while the amount of water
withdrawn remains the same. In the end, a bureaucratic initiative that governs only new or increased uses
may not yield any real water conservation. Proper
management of new uses necessarily involves management of existing uses. For example, one way to ensure
LAKES: THREE YEAR REVIEW

the conservation of water while authorizing new uses
would be to retire or limit existing uses through voluntaty or incentive-based programs, or by applying traditional reasonable use standards more strictly. In
discussing the possible terms of a new agreement
among the states and provinces on managing the water
resources of the Great Lakes, it makes no sense to take
this important aspect of the problem off the table.

A Comprehensive Planfor Managing the
Waters of the Great Lakes
Few can doubt the good intentions of all of the
parties associated with managing the water resources
of the Great Lakes. The states, provinces, and federal
governments have repeatedly expressed their genuine
interest in finding ways to improve the current management system. But for the reasons expressed above,
existing proposals are unlikely to address the current
problems in a meaningful way. Mindful that the ultimate goal of Annex 2001 is to find a simple and
durable framework that respects authority within the
basin and conserves and improves water resources,
Annex 2001 at 1, we offer the following proposal.
First, all of the parties should live up to the commitment that they made in the original Great Lakes
Charter of 1985 to develop a permit and registration
system for all significant water uses in their states,
whether new or preexisting. As the parties move toward meeting the Charter's directives, they should also
tighten the current standards, which require registration for uses in excess of one hundred thousand gallons
per day and permits for uses in excess of two million
gallons per day. There is no compelling reason not to
insist on permitting for all water uses beyond de minimis levels, including groundwater use. Ontario, for example, requires permits for all withdrawals in excess of
fifty thousand liters (13,209 gallons) per day, about
one-sixth the amount that triggers registration requirements under the charter. Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.40, s.34.
To the extent practical, data collection efforts
should include information about both withdrawals
and consumption. Once the states and provinces have
developed and implemented comprehensive permit
and data collection systems, a more reliable picture of
current water uses throughout the Great Lakes Basin
will emerge. Most importantly, the data will show
more clearly the levels of withdrawal and consumption
allowed by each state and province within the basin.
Reliable data opens enormous opportunities for conservation and better management.
First, accurate data will make it unnecessary to establish a "trigger" for reviewing individual new water
uses. The trigger concept would require joint review by
all of the Great Lakes states and provinces of all water
NR&E Fall 2003

uses that exceed the triggering level. Instead of reviewGreat Lakes governments should retain the authority to
ing individual uses, a trigger might be established for
review their decisions periodically as experience, changreviewing state or provincial decisions that result in a
ing needs, or political considerations dictate.
cumulative increase of water usage above a certain
Assuming that the Great Lakes states and
threshold. In this way, even the smallest new water uses
provinces agree to such a strategy, they will still want
will count toward the cumulative totals. Moreover,
to address their long-standing concerns about out-ofcases triggering review likely will be rare because the
basin diversions. If states and provinces are free to
states and provinces can avoid review simply by conmanage water within their caps as they see fit, they
serving their water resources in ways that will accommay choose to allow more water to leave the Great
modate new uses without exceeding the threshold.
Lakes Basin than is authorized under current law. In
An alternate and perhaps simpler way to manage
theory, this should not be a problem. An out-of-basin
the water of the Great Lakes Basin would be to cap
diversion, which can and should be treated as a 100
total water usage and give each state and province a
percent consumptive use, will have no greater impact
percentage of the cap that it could not exceed. The cap
on the basin than an in-basin use that consumes the
might be set annually or over a period of years, and it
same amount of water. States and provinces may, howcould be made dependent on water conditions and
ever, have legitimate concerns about their ability to retrends. In high water years, the cap
store water to the basin if and when
might grow; in low water years, the
it is needed there. To address this
cap might decrease. So long as a
issue, the parties might agree to
state or province stays under its perThe ultimateg oal ofAnnex
limit out-of-basin diversions to a
centage of the total cap, however, it
term of years, to limit the total
would be free to use its share of
amount of water that can be divertwater as it chooses. In this way, each
2001 is tof ind a simple and ed out of the basin by each party, or
state and province has a powerful
to condition out-of-basin permits
incentive-lacking in the current
durablefi -am ework that
on compensatory water resources
proposals and law-to conserve its
in the event that critical needs
water resources because conserving
respects aut.bority within the arise. Moreover, by treating out-ofwater consumed by existing users
basin water as a 100 percent confrees it for other users.
sumptive use, the states and
basin and con serves and
provinces will have a strong incenAlthough the allocation of a percentage would, no doubt, be difficult
tive to keep water in the basin
to negotiate, the current percentage
improves z ate'r resources.
where it can be used and reused
of water consumption by the individwithout counting against their cap.
ual states and provinces could serve as
This strategy is consistent with the
a useful starting point. The 2000 IJC
conservation and improvement
Report already includes data on consumptive use levels by
principles of Annex 2001, which should be incorporateach state and province, but more accurate data must be
ed within each jurisdiction as the states and provinces
developed in advance of any agreement through the data
move toward implementation of a comprehensive
collection systems described above. Adjustments would
water management program.
then be made to reflect instream needs for fisheries and
Despite numerous international and interjurisdicwildlife, as well as reserved rights for federal public lands
tional agreements, the water resources of the greatest
and Indian reservations within the basin. Once the perfreshwater resource in the world are not well managed.
centages are established, a central commission-such as
A new Great Lakes management regime must be dethe IJC -could be entrusted with managing the program.
veloped that replaces current incentives to waste water
Management tasks would likely include setting and adjustresources with meaningful incentives to conserve
ing the cap; collecting, auditing, and disseminating water
water resources. Annex 2001 offers the Great Lakes
usage data from the states and provinces; and adjusting
states and provinces an important opportunity to
and ensuring compliance with the cap percentages.
change their water management strategies in fundaBeyond the basic operation of this program, the
mental ways. Early indications from the negotiating
commission might also develop and implement a tradparties suggest, however, some reluctance to discard
ing program whereby states and provinces could buy
preconceived ideas about how best to manage and conand sell water resources among themselves. Water marserve this crucial international resource. Opportunities
keting has generally worked well in those limited cirto make the kind of fundamental changes that are
cumstances where it is made available from a large pool,
needed in the current management of the Great Lakes
typically a reservoir, where the ecological and social imwater resources will likely be rare. An opportunity expacts of the point of diversion and return flows are
ists now. For the sake of the Great Lakes, the states
roughly equivalent. If such a program were adopted, the
and provinces should embrace it.
NR&E Fall 2003

